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STRESZCZENIE
Celem artykułu jest pokazanie głębokiej więzi normatywnej pomiędzy koncepcją sfery pub-
licznej Jürgena Habermasa oraz pluralizmem mediów – jako jedną z podstawowych kondycji 
jej funkcjonowania. Artykuł w szczególności przybliża trzy wybrane kryteria generujące plu-
ralizm mediów: podzielane wartości i przestrzeń wspólnej wiedzy, autonomię mediów oraz 
otwartość i inkluzyjny charakter sfery publicznej. Przestrzeń wspólnej wiedzy i podzielanych 
wartości (takich jak np. wolność słowa i mediów) stanowi szersze środowisko deliberacyjne, 
w jakim zachodzi wymiana poglądów, kształtuje się debata i formuje się konsensus społeczny. 
Z kolei autonomia mediów oraz ich samoregulacyjny charakter odnoszą się do funkcjonalnej 
niezależności mediów (działania w zgodzie z własnymi zasadami etycznymi i profesjonalnymi) 
oraz niezależnością wobec świata politycznego i nacisków środowisk społecznych i gospo-
darczych. Otwartość sfery publicznej przejawia się w inkluzji różnych grup społecznych, ich 
potrzeb i interesów, a także zasadniczych poglądów na rzeczywistość społeczną i polityczną. 
Artykuł pokazuje empiryczne badanie trzech wybranych wymiarów sfery publicznej w kon-
tekście zastosowania MPM 2016 (Monitora Pluralizmu Mediów). W konkluzji podkreśla, że 
zaobserwowane i realnie występujące ryzyka w większości badanych krajów UE nie podważają 
zasadność przedstawionej w artykule koncepcji, ale mogą stanowić istotny wyznacznik tren-
dów i zmian w dłuższej perspektywie czasu.
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The public sphere revisited
The concept of the public sphere introduced by Jürgen Habermas in 1962 has 
shaped major normative perspectives in media and political communication 
scholarship for more than 30 years. In its initial form, the public sphere was con-
ceptualized as a social space where the exchange of information on matters of 
public concern contributes to the development of a public opinion that functions 
as political power.1 The matters or events of “public” concern refer those that are 
“open to all in contrast to closed or exclusive affairs.”2 The concept of the public 
sphere was subjected to a number of scholarly accounts and critiques, many of 
which led to reconsideration of the notion of the public sphere in changing geo-
political conditions (the notions of global, European public sphere), a technologi-
cal and media environment (the public sphere as a network) as well as evolving 
models of democracy (a monitory public sphere in the age of communicative 
abundance). Slavko Splichal argues that there is, nevertheless, no consensus 
among scholars and practitioners (e.g. politicians) what “the constituents of the 
public sphere are, how it is or could be established; who may or should partici-
pate in it and how; and whether the public sphere is a cause or a consequence of 
democratic developments.”3
In his attempt to reformulate a defi nition of the public sphere, Habermas sets 
new contours for the space: he portrays it as “a network for communicating in-
formation and points of view.”4 In this network the streams of communication are 
fi ltered and synthesized in such a way that “they coalesce into bundles of topically 
specifi ed public opinions.”5 Accordingly, the public sphere refers neither to the 
functions nor to the contents of everyday communication but to the social space 
generated in communicative action.6 The role of the media in all its forms is both 
constitutive and facilitating in the process of public sphere differentiation.
This chapter aims at an exploration of the Habermasian concept of the public 
sphere taking into consideration one of its constitutive conditions – diversity and 
pluralism, and the role of media pluralism in particular. It is argued that three 
principles are needed for media pluralism to fulfi ll its potential within the public 
sphere: shared values/shared background knowledge, autonomy/self-regulation 
and inclusiveness/openness. These three fundamental normative principles of me-
1 J. Habermas (1991). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into 
a Category of Bourgeois Society. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA; P. Dahlgren (1995). Television 
and the Public Sphere. Citizenship, Democracy and the Media. Sage Publications, London.
2 Ibidem, p. 1.
3 S. Splichal (2011). Transnationalization/Europeanization of the Public Sphere/s. In: M. Sükösd, 
K. Jakubowicz (eds.). Media, Nationalism and European Identities. CEU Press, Budapest, p. 23.
4 J. Habermas (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
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dia pluralism will be tested through an empirical assessment of selected aspects of 
media pluralism under the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM).
The public sphere, media and pluralism
Despite numerous reservations, in normative theories, the mass media are per-
ceived as the central infrastructure for public communication that should ensu-
re the formation of a plurality of “considered public opinions”,7 “enlightened 
understanding”8 and the “simultaneous presence of innumerable perspectives 
and aspects in which the common world presents itself.”9 Plurality and variety is 
thus conditionally linked to the public sphere, where, as Hannah Arendt observed, 
“everything can be seen and heard by everybody.”
In order to form a “considered public opinion”, several institutional arrange-
ments seem to be indispensable according to Jürgen Habermas: “a separation of 
a (tax-based) state from a (market-based) society, communication and association 
rights and a regulation of the power structure of the public sphere securing the 
diversity of independent media, and a general access of inclusive mass audiences 
to the public sphere.”10 Robert A. Dahl enumerates “alternative information” as 
one of seven essential institutions of polyarchy that are necessary for democra-
cy.11 “Alternative information” is referred to as a citizens’ communicative right 
(“citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information”), empiri-
cal condition (“alternative sources of information exist”) and a legal obligation 
(“alternative sources of information are protected by law”).12 In other words, as 
the institution of polyarchy – “alternative sources of information” would largely, 
although not exclusively, correspond with the pluralistic mass media that are to 
be recognized as a citizens’ communicative right, but should also exist in a demo-
cratic system and be protected by law. In the words of Katrin Voltmer,13 Dahl 
classifi es this “institution” of media pluralism as a precondition for the realiza-
tion of all the criteria of procedural democracy (except voting equality) and par-
7 J. Habermas (2006). Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy 
an Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research. Communication 
Theory, 16(4), p. 416.
8 R. Dahl (1979). Procedural Democracy. In: P. Laslett, J. Fishkin (eds.). Philosophy, Politics 
and Society: Fifth Series. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 97–133; R. Dahl (1989). Democracy and Its 
Critics. Yale University Press, New Heaven–London.
9 H. Arendt (1958). The Human Condition. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago–London, 
p. 57.
10 J. Habermas. Political Communication…, p. 412.
11 R. Dahl, op. cit., p. 223.
12 Ibidem.
13 K. Voltmer (2000). Structures of Diversity of Press and Broadcasting Systems: The Institution-
al Context of Public Communication in Western Democracies. Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für So-





















ticularly, the criterion of “enlightened understanding.” The public discussion and 
opinion-forming derives its signifi cance from diverse and alternative sources of 
information. Enlightened understanding implies adequate and equal opportunities 
of citizens for discovering and validating what their preferences are on the matter 
to be decided.14
Voltmer observes that the “enlightening” effect of diversity is often deduced 
from its competitive nature. The underlying assumption comes about that none of 
the different views in public bargaining can claim fi nal prevalence, thus all opin-
ions and views have equal and legitimate rights to public debate.15 Hannah Arendt 
links a valuable potential of diversity with “the reality of public life.” In other 
words, the reality of the public realm relies on diverse and multiple perspectives 
rooted in different locations in a society. Arendt shares the view that “being seen 
and being heard by others” derives signifi cance from the fact that each person 
can see and hear from a different perspective.16 “Only where things can be seen 
by many in a variety of aspects without changing their identity, so that those who 
are gathered around them know they see sameness in utter diversity, can worldly 
reality truly and reliably appear.”17
As already observed, the concept of media pluralism is viewed as an important 
condition for a well-functioning and democratic public sphere and the media, 
however it also incorporates political, economic and cultural value dimensions. In 
other words, a normative rationale for a policy action employs the understanding 
of media pluralism as a desirable and thus, not just any condition. Media plural-
ism functions as a value-ridden term, suggesting such an arrangement of a media 
system which supports a viable public sphere.
Shared values and shared background knowledge
Diversity and pluralism of views as a fundamental precondition of public sphere 
formation, stands as long “workable,” constructive and enlightening, as there are 
three principles met. There are, certainly, other conditions or preconditions of 
a public sphere, but these three seem to be central for diversity and pluralism 
as generated in and through the media. The fi rst of them lies in a source of vast 
shared background knowledge and social experience. For Arendt this common 
ground is represented by recognition that the public gathers in a common public 
space, thus together, ready to listen and share different views and experiences 
which everyone has gained thanks to the specifi c individual path but also a place 
occupied around the “common table.”18 Habermas argues that the ground of sha-
14 R. Dahl, op. cit., pp. 104–105.
15 K. Voltmer. Structures of Diversity…, p. 4.
16 H. Arendt. The Human Condition…, p. 57.
17 Ibidem.




















red knowledge refers to a “culturally familiar,” unproblematic environment that 
helps to explain how the daily process of consensus building is time and again 
able to cross the threshold of the risk of dissent.19 This implies on the one hand, 
the existence of shared values and common standards that safeguard the media 
infrastructure of public communications, such as freedom of expression and free-
dom of the media. In Habermas’ view such liberties are thereby supposed to pre-
serve an openness for competing opinions and representative diversity of voices.20 
On the other hand, the existence of shared “background knowledge” implies some 
common knowledge derived from the media, and especially exposure of issues of 
the common interest. In this regard, the public service media (PSM) have been 
normatively viewed as such sites of public debate and representation that generate 
or should generate a common deliberative space under their mission.
Media autonomy and self-regulation
Secondly, the public sphere, because it operates as an intermediary system be-
tween state and society, should maintain its independence from any institutional 
realms contributing to the formation of qualifi ed, representative opinion. Hanna 
Arendt observes that formation of opinion inside the political realm has its coun-
terbalance in public institutions established and supported by powers, in which, 
contrary to all political rules, truth and truthfulness have always been the highest 
criteria of speech and endeavor.21 These institutions include the judiciary (diffe-
rentiated by the rule of law), academia (differentiated by creation and dissemina-
tion of knowledge) and the media (differentiated by journalistic professionalism). 
Yet, there are the media that would have to be protected against governmental 
power and social pressure more carefully than the judiciary and academia as for 
their immediate political importance. The sheer function of providing information 
should be fulfi lled only outside the political realm strictly speaking and no politi-
cal action and no decision should be involved in this process.22
In other words, the autonomy and self-regulatory character of the media con-
dition a quality of a democratic public sphere: deliberative legitimation processes 
in complex societies can only be generated if “a self-regulating media system 
gains independence from social environments, and if anonymous audiences grant 
feedback between an informed elite discourse and a responsive civil society.”23 
Functional independence means the self-regulation of the media system in accord-
19 Cited in: J. Mitzen (2005). Reading Habermas in Anarchy: Multilateral Diplomacy and Global 
Public Spheres. American Political Science Review, 99(3), p. 403.
20 J. Habermas. Between Facts…, p. 368.
21 H. Arendt (1969). Truth and Politics, In: P. Laslett, W.G. Runciman (eds.). Philosophy, Politics 
and Society: Third Series. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 104–133.
22 Ibidem, p. 131.
23 J. Habermas. Political Communication…, p. 412.




















ance with its own normative codes,24 but also the actual independence of the media 
from political and social pressure in order to be receptive to the public’s concerns 
and proposals, taking up these and confronting the political process with articu-
late demands for legitimation.25 The independence and self-regulatory character 
of the media would imply on the one hand, that different constituting elements of 
the media system itself (be that either media organizations, or providers of me-
dia services) are autonomous, independent from its social environment and at the 
same time, located in diverse and different sites of the system in terms of function, 
geographical location and scope, cultural and linguistic environment. Independ-
ence from a political realm in particular requires not only transparency of media 
ownership, but also from the rules protecting against direct control of political par-
ties, groupings or politicians over media outlets. On the other hand, the functional 
independence of the media requires a high level of professional autonomy, broad 
acceptance of common normative codes and representation of common standards 
and needs through widely accepted and representative professional organizations.
Inclusiveness and openness
Thirdly, inclusiveness, is conditionally linked to the public sphere, which is sup-
posed to refl ect in an open manner various social actors, groups, their needs and 
interests, and also fundamental views on social and political reality. As regards 
social inclusiveness of the media this would not mean serving the audiences at 
the expense of lost independence and integrity, but rather offering incentives for 
citizens to learn, choose, and become involved, rather than merely follow the 
political process.26
Yet, in the age of a communicative abundance radically reshaping the media 
and communication environment, forms of the citizens’ involvement and inclu-
sion meet the pragmatic ground. Michael Schudson argues that “citizens scan 
(rather than read) the informational environment in a way so that they may be 
altered on a very wide variety of issues […] and may be mobilized around those 
issues in a large variety of ways.”27 Compared with the era of representative de-
mocracy, when print culture and limited spectrum audiovisual media were much 
more closely aligned with political parties and governments, the age of monitory 
democracy witnesses constant public scrutiny and spats about power where it 
seems that no organization or leader from a political system is immune from the 
effects of public surveillance.28 Thus, social inclusiveness of the media, support-
24 J.B. Thomson (1995). The Media and Modernity. Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, p. 258.
25 J. Habermas. Between Facts…, p. 378.
26 Gurevitch and Blumler cited in: ibidem, p. 378.
27 M. Schudson (1998). The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA–London, p. 310.





















ing inclusiveness and openness of the public sphere, implies on the one hand, 
a high level of media literacy and media awareness refl ecting conscious media use 
and involvement. On the other hand, social inclusiveness implies representation 
in and through the media environment of various social groups including minori-
ties. At the level of a media system as a whole, social inclusiveness and openness 
presuppose the existence of the third sector of the non-profi t, community media 
(in addition to mainstream private media and the PSM), closely tied with the so-
cial communities they serve.
Monitoring of media pluralism
How does this normative framework correspond with the actual patterns of me-
dia pluralism, practice and regulatory framework? An empirical assessment of 
media pluralism has posed a longstanding challenge, both in academia and in 
the media policy fi eld due to its complexity, necessity to balance various aspects 
(such as media ownership diversity, representative diversity of views and opi-
nions, cultural, geographical diversity) and the rapidly changing conditions of 
digital communication environments.29
In the media policy fi eld, the European Commission has attempted to address 
media pluralism and its assessment for a long time. On January 16, 2007 the 
Commission published a staff working document Media Pluralism in the Member 
States of the European Union.30 This document initiated a monitoring process of 
media pluralism alongside an independent study on media pluralism indicators 
(published in 2009).31 The study developed indicators for the measurement of 
pluralism and proposed a monitoring tool – the Media Pluralism Monitor (MPM), 
later adjusted and simplifi ed by the Center for Media Pluralism and Media Free-
dom (CMPF) affi liated with the European University Institute in Florence.32 The 
MPM has been applied as a pilot study in 2014 and 2015, and in 2016 fully for 
28 countries in the EU and in addition, Turkey and Montenegro.33 The main aim 
of the tool is to measure risks to media pluralism in four basic areas including: 
29 P. Valcke, R. Pickard, M. Sükösd (eds.) (2015). Media Pluralism and Diversity: Concepts, 
Risks and Global Trends. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke–New York; P.M. Napoli (ed.) (2007). 
Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics. LEA Publishers, Mahwah, NJ–London.
30 European Commission (2007). Commission Staff Working Document: Media Pluralism in the 
Member States of the European Union. 16.01.2007. SEC (2007) 32, Brussels.
31 For more details see: K.U. Leuven et al. (2009). Independent Study on Indicators for Media 
Pluralism in the Member States – Towards a Risk-Based Approach. Prepared for the European Com-
mission Directorate-General Information Society and Media. K.U. Leuven, Leuven [http://ec.europa.
eu/information_society/media_taskforce/doc/pluralism/pfr_report.pdf; 20.11.2017].
32 The author of this article participated in research activities of the independent group of experts 
preparing the methodology for MPM in 2008 and 2009 and implemented the methodology practi-
cally in MPM in 2015, 2016 and 2017 in Poland.
33 For more details see: CMPF (Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom), http://cmpf.
eui.eu/; 10.12.2017.




















basic protection (covering regulatory safeguards for the freedom of expression, 
right to information, journalistic profession and protection, and independence 
of media regulatory authorities), market plurality (covering media transparency, 
monomedia and crossmedia concentration, media viability), political independ-
ence (covering political control over media outlets, editorial autonomy, media and 
democratic electoral process, independence of the PSM) and social inclusiveness 
(covering access to media of minorities, disabled persons, women, local and re-
gional communities, condition of community media and media literacy). 
Shared normative values and background knowledge: protection of 
freedom of expression and the role of PSM
The common ground of shared values and background knowledge is refl ected in 
two important aspects of media pluralism and its assessment. The fi rst of them 
refers to protection of the freedom of expression as an essential condition for the 
formation of a viable public sphere through the free exchange of information and 
views concerning issues of common concern. In this regard, freedom of expres-
sion and the media present a shared value, a need that has to be met in societies, 
and also a right, implying obligations and responsibilities, that can be demanded. 
The second aspect fi nds its expression in the concept of the Public Service Media 
(PSM), potentially offering a common media space for a distillation of shared ba-
ckground knowledge in an increasingly fragmented media environment. With the 
growing communicative abundance and fragmentation of the audiences, the PSM 
may eventually generate social cohesion, common ground for a rational political 
debate and a common space for the representation of culture in its diversity. This 
would require, however, a high level of professional quality of the PSM, integrity 
with its mission and grounding principles, as well as strong institutional autono-
my and functional independence.
As regards to the protection of freedom of expression and the media, this in-
dicator is measured in the MPM 2016 under the basic protection area. The main 
aim of this measurement is to assess the existence and effective implementation 
of regulatory safeguards for the freedom of expression in a given country.34 The 
results of the monitoring show that legal protection of freedom of expression 
and the media is formally guaranteed in all of the researched countries, being 
enshrined either in constitutions or national laws. At the same time, results for
25 countries show a low risk, for four countries (including Poland, Hungary, Lat-
via and Romania) a medium risk, and for Turkey a high risk.
34 CMPF (2017). Monitoring Media Pluralism in Europe: Application of the Media Pluralism 
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Figure 1: Protection of freedom of expression in the MPM 2016
Source: The Media Pluralism Monitor, http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/mpm-2016-re-
sults/basic-protection/; 10.12.2017.
The main differences among the countries lie in the legal solutions concerning 
limitations of freedom of expression and the media, and in the proportionality of 
these limitations. For instance one of the most problematic issues in this regard 
remains the criminalisation of defamation. Standards developed by the Council 
of Europe35 point to the fact that criminalisation of defamation may be easily 
misused, producing a chilling effect on the freedom of the media, in particular in 
cases in which public offi cials are involved. The MPM results demonstrate that 
most of the countries guarantee special protection to public offi cials and heads of 
states against defamation.36 Speaking from the normative perspective, however, 
we should expect from public fi gures a higher degree of exposure to public criti-
cism than ordinary citizens.37
35 See e.g. Resolution 1577 (2007) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
Towards decriminalization of defamation [http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
en.asp?fi leid=17588&lang=en; 3.01.2018].
36 CMPF. Monitoring Media…




















As regards the role of the PSM, independence of PSM governance and fund-
ing is measured under the political independence area. A main aim of this indica-
tor, is to measure the risks which stem from appointment procedures for the top 
management positions in the PSM, risks arising from funding mechanisms, as 
well as risks of political infl uence under which the PSM are no longer able to 
fulfi ll their mission. The results of measurement display a relatively high number 
of countries (13) with a high risk, associated mainly with the appointment pro-
cedures of managing boards and directors general.38 The countries with the high-
est level of risk include among others: Cyprus, Hungary, Romania, Turkey and 
Montenegro. On the other hand, the group of countries with a low risk, includes 
UK, France, Sweden, Germany, Denmark and six other countries.39 This picture 
shows not only a highly diversifi ed potential for generating shared background 
38 CMPF. Monitoring Media…
39 Ibidem.
Figure 2: Independence of PSM governance and funding in the MPM 2016
Source: The Media Pluralism Monitor, http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/
mpm-2016-results/political-independence/Media autonomy and self-regulation: the 




















knowledge by the PSM in Europe, but suggests that varying technical dimensions 
(appointment procedures and management, accountability, fi nancing mechanisms 
and performance) are rooted in the various traditions of PSM legacy and perfor-
mance.
The formation of a plurality of considered public opinions within the public 
sphere relies on a functionally specifi c and self-regulating media system.40 In the 
MPM such a condition is refl ected in the indicator assessing journalistic profes-
sionalism, the standards of the profession and protection. In addition, autonomy 
and self-regulation implies political independence and a lack of political control 
over media outlets.
Concerning the journalistic profession, standards and protection, this indicator 
is measured under the MPM 2016 in the basic protection area. It seeks to detect 
risks resulting from conditions to access the journalistic profession, working con-
40 J. Habermas. Political Communication…, p. 412.
Figure 3: Journalistic profession, standards and protection in the MPM 2016
Source: The Media Pluralism Monitor, http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/
mpm-2016-results/basic-protection/; 10.12.2017.




















ditions, the effectiveness of professional organisations to guarantee professional 
standards and autonomy, the existence and implementation of rules guaranteeing 
the safety of journalists (both physical and social). The empirical results demon-
strate a considerable number of countries with a medium risk (including among 
others Italy, Hungary, Romania, Greece and Turkey). As regards the effectiveness 
of professional associations and journalistic unions, the measurement shows an 
overall medium risk 46% across the 30 countries, at the same time, progressively 
fewer journalists are represented by professional associations.41
The sub-indicator on the protection of journalists scores an alarming average 
of 52% of the risk as most of the countries manifest a medium or high risk for 
the safety of journalists.42 The problems with the safety of journalists denote both 
attacks on the physical integrity of the journalists as well as threats coming from 
41 CMPF. Monitoring Media…, p. 17.
42 Ibidem.
Figure 4: Political control over media outlets in the MPM 2016





















online surveillance. The countries with the highest risk in this regards include 
Turkey in fi rst place, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Montenegro and others.
Political control over media outlets is measured under the political independ-
ence area, designed to assess the risks of political interference on the level of 
a media system, media organisation, newsroom and content.43 Political control 
over media outlets is measured through consideration of availability and effec-
tive implementation of regulatory safeguards against the direct and indirect con-
trol of the media by politicians. The notion of control encompasses both direct 
media ownership by politicians and indirect control assuming media ownership 
by intermediaries connected with political parties or the politicians themselves. 
Overall, six countries display a low risk (including Sweden, the UK, France and 
others), 10 countries manifest a medium risk (including Germany, Spain, Greece 
and other countries) and the largest amount – the remaining 14 score a high risk 
(including Poland, the Czech Republic, Italy and other countries).44
The CMPF Final Report observes that very often high risks emerge from the 
lack of transparency of media ownership and a lack of public knowledge about 
the political affi liation of the owners.45
These results suggest that limits to journalistic autonomy and political inde-
pendence still defi ne the conditions for journalistic practice and media operations 
in a relatively large number of countries in the European Union. Such circum-
stances certainly infl uence the self-regulating character of a media system, in 
which a growing dependency on external domains such as politics, confi nes the 
formation of plurality opinions within the public sphere.
Openness and social inclusiveness
Social inclusiveness of the public sphere, and social inclusiveness of the media 
in particular, refl ect the participatory and diverse character of the public sphere, 
being a constitutive condition of deliberative practices. In this respect, the open-
ness and diversity of the public sphere manifests themselves at the level of access 
and representation of various social and cultural groups in the media as well as in 
a structure of the media system, consisting of mainstream as well as minority and 
community media. The social inclusiveness indicators in the MPM 2016 examine 
access to the media by various social and cultural groups such as minorities, legal/
regional communities, people with disabilities and women. In addition, the social 
inclusiveness area monitors conditions of the third media sector – community 
media and media literacy – both at the level of a regulatory design and policy as 
well as practice and implementation.
43 Ibidem.
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem, p. 39.




















Figure 5: Social inclusiveness area in the MPM 2016
Source: The Media Pluralism Monitor, http://cmpf.eui.eu/media-pluralism-monitor/
mpm-2016-results/social-inclusiveness/; 10.12.2017.
The results of the measurement show that most of the countries – 21 – score 
a medium risk for the whole social inclusiveness area. Three countries detect a high 
risk (including Turkey, Greece and Latvia), while six countries display a low risk 
(including among others France, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden). One of 
the most problematic indicators in this area proved to be “access to the media for 
minorities” demonstrating that only four countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Es-
tonia and Hungary) score a low risk. The issue of minorities’ access to the media 
also refl ects to a great extent the question of legal and policy recognition of various 
ethnic, cultural and national groups. In many cases, the offi cial status of “national 
minorities” or “historical national minorities” is enjoyed by a relatively small num-
ber of minorities (e.g. in Germany) that might be entitled to claim communication 
rights such as access to the PSM or commercial media, or be supported in order to 
produce their own media.46





















The indicator on access to the media for local and regional communities and 
community media shows that almost two thirds of these countries (17) are in 
a medium or high risk. On the hand, the indicator points to the strengths and 
weaknesses of the local and regional media vis-à-vis the national media, while on 
the other hand it reveals the condition of the third sector – the community media. 
Both these aspects stem from various circumstances – such as is in the case of 
the administrative structure of the country (the stronger the position of the re-
gions is in an administrative design, the stronger might be the regional media and 
regulatory solutions supporting them), historical tradition and background, the 
congruence between ethnic/cultural differences and the political or administrative 
autonomy of regions.
Finally, the media literacy indicator demonstrates signifi cant differences 
between the North-Western part of the researched EU countries and the South-
Eastern part. The group of countries with a high risk includes Turkey, Italy, Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Montenegro, while the group of countries with a medium 
risk includes Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Estonia, Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus.47 Media 
literacy plays a principal role in media use, and more generally in participation in 
the public sphere equipping media users and citizens not only with the abilities 
and skills to access and critically “read” media contents, but also making the users 
aware and conscious of their personal goals. As can be seen from the application 
of the MPM in 2016, there still seems to be a difference between the media litera-
cy policies as well as the skills demonstrated by media users in the EU countries.
Conclusions
A communication model of deliberative politics taking shape through the for-
mation of a viable and democratic public sphere proves valuable for an inter-
pretation of empirical fi ndings concerning media pluralism in a cross-national 
European perspective, especially when three of its key aspects (shared values and 
background common knowledge, self-regulatory media system and social inclu-
siveness) are distinguished. In Jürgen Habermas’ words “the model directs our 
attention specifi cally to those variables that explain failures in the maintenance of 
a self-regulating media system and a proper feedback between the public sphere 
and civil society.”48
These variables refl ect two major lines of debate about the public sphere: 
structure and the nature and function of the discourses it carries.49 A proper feed-
back between the public sphere and civil society lies in the structure of the public 
47 CMPF. Monitoring Media…
48 J. Habermas. Political Communication…, p. 423.
49 N. Garnham (2007). Habermas and the Public Sphere. Global Media and Communication, 
3(2), pp. 201–214.




















sphere and the nature of access, openness and inclusiveness of the public sphere. 
As the MPM 2016 fi ndings for the social inclusiveness area show, in a relatively 
signifi cant number of the EU countries, there is a medium or high risk concern-
ing access of various social and cultural groups to the media, and in particular 
minorities. Also, there seems to be a clear divide between the North-Western part 
of the researched EU countries and South-Eastern part in respect to policy and 
practice of media literacy. The MPM fi ndings on social inclusiveness revealing 
a medium and high risk resonate with Habermas’ observation of “an ambivalent, 
if not outright pessimistic conclusion” about the kind of impact the media has on 
the involvement of citizens in politics and public sphere formation.50
As regards the functions of the discourses the public sphere carries, discursive 
conditions and normative claims depend on the one hand on shared values and 
background knowledge as well as the self-regulatory and autonomous character 
of the media. The MPM 2016 fi ndings for the protection of freedom of expression 
show the widely accepted value of protection of freedom of expression, enshrined 
either in constitutions or the national laws of the researched countries. At the same 
time, there are signifi cant differences among the countries in the legal solutions 
concerning the limitations of freedom of expression and the media, and in the 
proportionality of these limitations. Also the institutional embeddedness of a con-
cept of a common shared background knowledge in PSM status and performance 
proves quite problematic in cross-European comparison. Still, in a large number 
of European countries (13), the PSM lack governance and fi nancial independ-
ence. According to Habermas, such conditions might suggest an incomplete dif-
ferentiation of the media from its political environment rather than a temporary 
interference with the independence of the media that has already reached the level 
of self-regulation.51
With regard to the self-regulatory character of the media, the MPM 2016 meas-
urement of the journalistic profession indicator reveals a considerable number of 
countries with a medium risk (including among others Italy, Hungary, Romania, 
Greece and Turkey), at the same time it also shows alarming scores concerning 
the protection and safety of the journalists, denoting both attacks on the physical 
integrity of the journalists as well as threats coming from online surveillance. The 
MPM 2016 measurement of political control over media outlets displays a robust 
majority of 24 countries either with a medium risk (10) or a high risk (14). Insuf-
fi cient regulatory protection of the media and journalists from political infl uence 
enables media owners to convert media power into public infl uence and politi-
cal pressure.52 The radical loss of media autonomy and self-regulatory conditions 
leads to “media capture,” defi ned by Joseph E. Stiglitz as a situation in which 
one or more of the parties that the media are supposed to be monitoring on behalf 
50 J. Habermas. Political Communication…, p. 422.





















of society ‘captures’ or takes hostage of the media, so that they fail to perform
their societal function.53 Moreover, the self-regulatory and autonomous character 
of the media also suffers from the colonization of the public sphere by a market 
imperative, and the redefi nition of politics in market categories. In such a process, 
issues of political discourse become assimilated into and absorbed by the modes 
and contents of entertainment.54
The risks described above as affecting the deliberative potential of media plu-
ralism (and in particular the principles of shared common values and the back-
ground knowledge, self-regulatory character of the media, and social inclusive-
ness) do not suggest questioning a normative concept and the validity of the 
public sphere in deliberative politics and a changing communicative environment. 
On the contrary, this chapter argues that directing our attention to cross-national 
research on media pluralism may improve our capacity to refl ect on the public 
sphere in a rapidly changing media and communication environment, transnation-
al perspective and vis-à-vis new challenges in media use and deliberative politics.
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